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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Additional Statement of Facts, 
Utah Code Ann. 7-1-318 required the Bank of Utah not only to 
file call reports with the Commissioner of the Utah Department of 
Financial Institutions, but also to publish a certified copy of 
each report in a newspaper having general circulation in Weber 
County. (Ex. 72P) 
II. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. The Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, infra; Canyon 
Country Store v. Bracey, infra; and Berube v. Fashion Centre, 
Ltd., infra, trilogy of cases infer that a broad range of 
recoverable damages, including attorney fees as an item of 
consequential damages, are available for breach of an 
implied-in-fact contract of employment. Since Berube stated the 
true nature of the law, both retrospectively and prospectively, 
this Court should imply that the Bank could have reasonably 
foreseen that Heslop would incur attorney fees if the Bank 
breached the parties' implied-in-fact contract. The rationale 
for an award of attorney fees in a breach of a first-party 
insurance contract case is equally applicable to a wrongful 
termination of employment case. 
B. Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., infra, is supported by 
dubious legal precedent . Some form of the exception based on an 
implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing is 
necessary because the other two exceptions apply only in 
specialized and very limited factual circumstances. The 
interpretation of the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing urged in Heslop's principal brief represents a 
reasonable compromise between employer and employee interests and 
should be adopted by this Court. 
C. House v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., infra, is 
distinguishable from the instant case. In Utah, the existence of 
a public policy cause of action should not turn on whether a 
report is made to a public or a private official, but on whether 
the harm caused by an employer's wrongdoing affects only the 
business itself or the public in general. The harm caused by the 
Bank's inaccurate call reports affected the general public, 
therefore, Heslop's claim of a public policy violation should 
have gone to the jury. 
D. A large majority of courts that recognize the public 
policy exception have held that it sounds in tort. The factors 
relied upon by the few courts that recognize the public policy 
exception as a contract cause of action may not apply in the 
State of Utah. Independent tort causes of action present almost 
insurmountable problems of proof for an employee because the 
employer usually controls all the evidence. A tort cause of 
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action for violation of public policy is the best means of 
assuring responsible control of the private power to discharge an 
at-will employee. 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Trial Court should have allowed a jury instruction 
on attorney fees as an item of consequential damages. 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) 
was a wrongful termination case based on an implied-in-fact 
contract exception to the employment-at-will doctrine*. A 
majority of the justices on the court held that general and 
consequential damages were available if the finder of fact 
determined there was a breach of the implied-in-fact contract. 
The justices cited directly to Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 
P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). Berube at 1050, 1053. Berube did not say 
that general and consequential damages are only available for 
breach of an implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
The Beck court envisioned "a broad range of recoverable 
damages" in a breach of a first-party insurance contract case. 
701 P.2d at 802. In Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 
414, 420 (Utah 1989), the court interpreted this "broad range of 
recoverable damages" to include attorney fees as an item of 
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consequential damages. Once again, this Court cited directly to 
Beck. Id. 
The inference is clear that a broad range of recoverable 
damages, including attorney fees as an item of consequential 
damages, are available for breach of an implied-in-fact contract 
of employment. The Trial Court erred in refusing to give a jury 
instruction to that effect. 
Berube stated the true nature of the law, both 
retrospectively and prospectively. Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 
(Utah 1984). Theoretically, the law in Utah has always 
recognized an implied-in-fact contract exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrine. This being the case, it must also 
be implied that the Bank could have reasonably foreseen that 
Heslop would incur attorney fees if the Bank breached the 
parties1 implied-in-fact contract. 
Like an insured in a bad faith insurance case, a 
wrongfully-discharged employee often faces catastrophic 
consequences, as a direct result of the employer's misconduct, at 
a time when he is particularly vulnerable, both economically and 
emotionally. 
The opportunity for self-employment in 
America has steadily declined. Ninety 
percent of our workforce can be classified as 
wage or salary earners. We have become a 
nation of employees dependent upon others for 
almost all of our income. Today, if a worker 
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loses his job, he loses almost every resource 
except social welfare relief. During the 
last 50 years, the ability of employees to 
make employment changes has decreased, 
particularly when the job seeker is old or 
has only been employed by a single employer 
for many years. Termination can become a 
permanent blot upon an employee's record. It 
is far more difficult to obtain a job with 
the stigma of having once been fired. To 
most Americans, no consideration other than 
life, liberty, and property has greater 
importance than employment. 
Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The Erosion of One Hundred Years of 
Employer Privilege, 21 Idaho L. Rev. 201, 204-05 (1985) 
[citations omitted]. 
The rationale used in Beck to justify "a broad range of 
recoverable damages" is equally applicable to a 
wrongful-termination-of-employment case. Due to the potential 
for severe economic and emotional harm to the employee, the 
employee's inability to protect his interests, and the employer's 
unique ability to severely harm the employee, an award of 
attorney fees is more justifiable in a wrongful termination case 
than in a case involving an arm's-length transaction between 
parties with relatively equal bargaining power. 
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B. This Court should vacate its decision in BREHANY v. 
NORDSTROM and allow a cause of action for breach of an 
implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
in a wrongful termination of indefinite-term employment 
case. 
In Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.. supra at 1040, 1050, this 
Court acknowledged the questionable origins of the 
employment-at-will doctrine. Also, this Court soundly criticized 
Martin v. New York Life Insurance Co,, 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 
(1895). 
In the leading case of Martin v. New York 
Life Insurance Company, 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 
416 (1895), the Court repudiated the common 
law presumption that a general hiring was for 
a term of one year and uncritically embraced 
the at-will rule as framed by Wood. The 
Martin opinion did not analyze any prior 
authority, but did assert that several other 
states had adopted the at-will rule. 
Berube at 1041. 
In Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49 (Utah 1991), this 
Court used the at-will employment language in Murphy v. American 
Home Products Corp., 59 N.Y.2d 293, 304-05, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 
237, 448 N.E.2d 86, 91 (1983) to support its decision that Utah 
law does not recognize an implied-in-law covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing in the employment context. Brehany at 55-56. 
In Murphy, the Court of Appeals of New York failed to follow 
the nationwide judicial trend of recognizing exceptions to the 
employment-at-will doctrine. The Murphy court said, "Thus, in 
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the case now before us, plaintiff's employment was at will, a 
relationship in which the law accords the employer an unfettered 
right to terminate the employment at any time," Brehany at 55 
(quoting Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 304-05, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 237, 448 
N.E.2d at 91). The Murphy court deferred to the New York state 
legislature the creation of an exception to the 
employment-at-will doctrine. 448 N.E.2d at 90. 
The first case cited by the Murphy court to support its 
slavish adherence to the employment-at-will doctrine was Martin 
v. New York Life Insurance Co. 448 N.E.2d at 89. As Berube 
explained, the Martin court relied upon the writings of Horace G. 
Wood to support its decision. Thus, in a sense, Brehany is 
supported by the same unsound logic that was so heavily 
criticized by this Court in Berube. 
This Court should create exceptions to the 
employment-at-will doctrine that are reasonable compromises 
between employer and employee interests. Some form of the 
exception based on an implied-in-law covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing is necessary because the other two exceptions apply 
only in specialized and very limited factual circumstances. The 
total elimination of the exception based on an implied-in-law 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing will allow employers to 
continue to perpetrate unreasonable dismissals in a broad range 
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of factual situations. For example, absent facts sufficient for 
the case to fall under another exception, an employer could still 
terminate a long-term employee solely to prevent him from 
receiving a bonus, commission, or other benefit to which he had 
become, or would soon become, entitled. 
All three primary categories of exceptions to the 
employment-at-will rule are necessary if we are to ever have a 
level playing field in the employment arena. The exception based 
on an implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing need 
not upset the delicate balance by requiring a just cause standard 
for all employers. The standard urged in Heslop's principal 
brief, which recognizes that the absence of good cause is only 
one factor in determining whether there was good faith and fair 
dealing, represents a reasonable compromise between employer and 
employee interests and should be adopted by this Court. See also 
Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The Erosion of One Hundred Years of 
Employer Privilege, 21 Idaho L. Rev. 201, 249-54 (1985) [attached 
hereto as Addendum "A"]. 
C. The Trial Court should have allowed the jury to decide 
whether Heslop's wrongful termination violated public 
policy* 
House v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 232 N.J. Super. 41, 556 A.2d 
353 (1989), cited in Defendant's Reply Brief at page 23, is 
distinguishable from the instant case. Moreover, Defendant cites 
-8-
to House for the questionable proposition that whistleblowers 
must report employer misconduct directly to regulatory 
authorities in order to have a cause of action for violation of 
public policy. 
House claimed he was terminated for his opposition to 
Carter-Wallace's distribution of certain batches of allegedly 
contaminated Pearl Drops Tooth Polish. House voiced his 
opposition in one internal corporate meeting and to his immediate 
supervisor, however, he did not convey his views directly to the 
top management of Carter-Wallace. Id. at 356, 357. No one at 
Carter-Wallace resented House's opposition to the distribution of 
the tooth polish. The court concluded that House did not have a 
reasonable basis for his belief that the tooth polish should not 
be distributed. The quality control division conducted extensive 
testing and concluded that the tooth polish could be distributed 
without danger to the public and in compliance with the law. Id. 
at 358. 
Heslop reported the accrual problem to Browning, the 
President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank of 
Utah, and Browning responded that he would take care of the 
problem. (Tr. 136) He also explained to Browning that the 
accrual problem should be immediately resolved. (Tr. 142, 144) 
Heslop often discussed the accrual problem with other officers 
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and at least four directors of the Bank. (Tr. 348, 842) He had 
a reasonable basis for opposing the Bank's method of resolving 
the accrual problem because he knew the Bank would overstate its 
income which would result in the filing of inaccurate call 
reports each quarter. (Tr. 337) Heslop's position was later 
proved correct. (Tr. 1253-54; Ex. 67P) Browning and Kunz were 
contemptuous of Heslop for exposing the accrual problem. (Tr. 
597, 854-57) 
In December 1981, Heslop began preparing personal notes 
about events relating to the accrual problem. (Ex. 39P) 
Heslop's adamant opposition eventually prompted Beutler to report 
the accrual problem to regulatory authorities. (Tr. 149) 
During the examination of the Bank by the Department of 
Financial Institutions in August 1982, Heslop voluntarily 
approached representatives of the Commissioner about the accrual 
problem. (Tr. 177-78) Later, in September 1982, he voluntarily 
met with a representative of the Utah Attorney General. At the 
meeting, Heslop made a reasonable request that his testimony and 
personal notes be subpoenaed so he could protect his position 
with the Bank. (Tr. 154-56, 357, 477-78) 
In October 1982, the Bank's attorneys persuaded Heslop to 
turn over his personal notes to them. (Tr. 166-69) In 
November 1982, Heslop again met with a representative of the 
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Attorney General, but without his personal notes. Heslop was 
overshadowed at the meeting by the Bank's attorney, Wayne Black, 
who argued for an end to the investigation• (Tr. 170-71) 
Thus, in 1982, the Bank tried to prevent Heslop from making 
a full report to the authorities. Now, however, the Bank argues 
that Heslop should be denied a cause of action because he failed 
to make such a report. The Bank cannot have it both ways. 
The Bank's Reply Brief does not provide any reasoning to 
support its proposition that a whistleblower must report directly 
to regulatory authorities in order to have a cause of action. 
This oversight is understandable because there is no sound 
reasoning to support the Bank's proposition. To impose an 
outside reporting requirement would encourage whistleblowers to 
initially report to outside officials without giving the employer 
an opportunity to correct, internally and without unnecessary 
publicity, harmful conduct which may only be the result of 
inadvertence or a lack of communication. The underlying policy 
goals to prevent public harm may often be just as effectively 
served by communication within an organization to achieve prompt 
compliance as they are by public disclosure. The Bank's 
proposition does nothing but promote form over substance. In 
Utah, the existence of a public policy cause of action should not 
turn on whether a report is made to a public or a private 
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official, but on whether the harm caused by an employer's 
wrongdoing affects only the business itself or the public in 
general. 
The statutory requirement that all call reports be published 
in a newspaper having general circulation in the county where the 
principal office of the financial institution is located is 
evidence of an intent by the legislature to protect the general 
public- U.C.A. 7-1-318, Undoubtedly, members of the general 
public relied upon the information contained in the published 
call reports in making important financial decisions and 
protecting their financial interests. The harm caused by 
inaccurate call reports affected the general public, therefore, 
Heslop's claim of a public policy violation should have gone to 
the jury. 
In Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Company, 108 111.2d 502, 
92 111. Dec. 561, 485 N.E.2d 372 (1985), the plaintiff alleged 
that he was discharged in retaliation for his refusal to work in 
the handling of radioactive materials while operations were being 
conducted in violation of regulations promulgated by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. The defendant argued that the plaintiff 
failed to report the violations to appropriate authorities, 
therefore, the controversy remained an internal matter between 
the employer and employee and no public policy question was 
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involved. In holding for the plaintiff and reversing the court 
of appeals, the Supreme Court of Illinois stated: 
We do not agree with the appellate court that 
the question whether the facts as alleged 
involved public policy, or a matter of 
private concern, depended upon whether a 
complaint was made to the regulatory 
authorities. The legislation and the 
regulations declared the public policy, and 
the existence of that public policy did not 
depend upon whether plaintiff had 
communicated a complaint to the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission or whether its 
investigation preceded or followed that 
complaint. 
485 N.E.2d at 376. The Wheeler Court allowed the plaintiff to 
proceed to trial on a public policy cause of action even though 
his allegations that the employer violated Federally-mandated 
safety codes were made internally only. Id. at 377; see also 
Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 
385 (1980); and McOuary v. Belaire Convalescent Home, Inc., 69 
Or. App. 107, 684 P.2d 21 (1984), review den. 298 Or. 37, 688 
P.2d 845 (1984). 
D. The public policy exception to the employment-at-will 
doctrine should sound in tort. 
The standard approach in determining whether a cause of 
action sounds in tort or contract "focuses upon the duty which 
has allegedly been breached and asks whether that duty arises 
from a promise set forth in the contract or is one imposed by 
law." Mauk, supra at 2 09. Although it would appear that a 
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prohibition against violating public policy arises from a duty 
imposed by law, some judges assert that it arises from an 
implied-in-law promise, set forth in the contract, not to violate 
public policy. Berube, supra, at 1051; Brockmever, infra, at 
841. Thus, the standard approach yields no clear answer when 
considering the public policy exception to the at-will employment 
rule. 
A large majority of courts that recognize the public policy 
exception have held that it sounds in tort. Presumably, the 
intelligent justices on these numerous courts carefully weighed 
the arguments on both sides of the issue before reaching their 
conclusions. In Utah, Judge Thomas Greene of the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah considered the issue of 
whether the public policy exception sounds in tort or contract 
and held that it is an action founded upon tort. See Peterson v. 
Browning, No. 400401 (Utah undecided) [A copy of Judge Greene's 
Memorandum Decision and Order in the Federal action is attached 
hereto as Addendum lfB".] 
The factors relied upon by the few courts that recognize the 
public policy exception as a contract cause of action may not 
apply in the State of Utah. In Brockmeyer v. Dunn & Bradstreet, 
113 Wis.2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983), the court noted that the 
Wisconsin legislature "has enacted a variety of statutes to 
-14-
prohibit certain types of discharges." 3 5 N.W.2d at 841. In 
trying to decide whether a wrongful discharge action should be 
maintained in tort or contract, the court found that "[t]he 
remedies established by the majority of Wisconsin wrongful 
discharge statutes are limited to reinstatement and back pay, 
contractual remedy concepts." Id. The court concluded that a 
contract action is most appropriate for wrongful discharges. 
Utah wrongful discharge statutes, however, do not impose the same 
limitations as the Wisconsin statutes and, therefore, would not 
support the argument that the Utah legislature favors a 
contractual remedy in wrongful discharge cases. (R. 202-03) 
The Brockmeyer court's premise that contract damages are 
most appropriate because they are primarily concerned with making 
the wronged employee "whole" is certainly questionable. 
Reinstatement is seldom feasible in a wrongful termination case. 
Neither reinstatement nor back pay compensate for emotional 
injury to an employee. Tort damages far surpass contract damages 
in addressing the primary concern of making the wronged employee 
"whole." 
In Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239 743 S.W.2d 
380 (1988), the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted the contract 
approach. But, it based its decision on the fact that "if an 
employer's conduct in breaching a contract of employment is 
-15-
sufficiently egregious or extreme, the employee can still claim 
tort damages on a cause of action for outrage." 743 S.W.2d at 
385. A wrongfully-discharged employee in the State of Utah, 
however, will find it very difficult to bring a tort claim for 
outrage because this Court has already held that "mere discharge 
from employment does not constitute outrageous or intolerable 
conduct by an employer." Sperber v. Galiaher Ash Co., 747 P.2d 
1025, 1028 (Utah 1987). An employer will always try to tie his 
conduct to the discharge. 
Moreover, the types of independent tort causes of action 
that may apply in a wrongful termination case, such as 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and 
defamation, present almost insurmountable problems of proof for 
an employee because the employer usually controls all the 
evidence. 
The mere fact that the employment relationship is initially 
contractual does not justify a conclusion that the public policy 
exception sounds in contract. In a medical malpractice case, the 
initial relationship between physician and patient is 
contractual. When the physician commits malpractice, he breaches 
the parties1 contract, however, he also violates a duty imposed 
by law which gives the patient a cause of action in tort. An 
implied-in-law promise not to violate public policy is a rather 
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extreme manipulation of contract law that is unnecessary since 
the traditional tort theory approach will accomplish the same 
desired result. 
A public policy exception sounding in tort will allow juries 
and the courts to be more sensitive to the equities in a given 
case and apply a broader range of remedies. An especially 
egregious violation of public policy may justify imposing 
punitive damages. An award of punitive damages not only punishes 
the wrongdoer and deters unacceptable conduct, but can also 
create an incentive for private individuals to bring wrongdoers 
to justice. This financial incentive can be an important factor 
in motivating a plaintiff to press a claim, particularly one for 
which only a small compensatory remedy is available. Punitive 
damages can also serve a compensatory function by compensating 
the plaintiff for transactional expenses such as attorney fees. 
See Mallor, Punitive Damages for Wrongful Discharge of At-Will 
Employees, 26 William & Mary L. Rev. 449, 489-91 (1985) [attached 
hereto as Addendum lfCfl]. 
A decision by this Court to recognize a tort cause of action 
for violation of public policy will not have a "chilling effect" 
on employers, causing them to retain unproductive employees. 
Employers who routinely obey the law will never be troubled by 
the public policy exception because their actions will not 
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violate public policy. Only employers who violate the law, or 
encourage others to do so, will have the added worry of tort 
damages for violation of public policy. 
As many of the decided cases illustrate, the 
burden of the at-will employment doctrine 
seems to be falling most heavily and harshly 
upon professional and upper and middle level 
employees. They have the least protection. 
Most are at-will employees and few have job 
security through union or individually 
negotiated contracts. They have the most to 
lose, frequently being the long-term 
employees who have the greatest 
responsibility and substantial investment in 
and the highest expectations from their 
careers. Often they are at an age when 
replacement of their life and medical 
insurance programs and their retirement plans 
are difficult or impossible. They are the 
most vulnerable to the improper demands of 
employers who find it profitable to take 
chances with anti-trust and consumer fraud 
violations, environmental pollution, 
health-related misconduct, defense 
procurement fraud, and the like. The at-will 
employment doctrine does not include, 
contemplate or require a privilege in the 
employer to subject its employees to the 
risks of civil and criminal liability that 
participation in such activities entails. 
The public policy exception is narrow enough 
in its scope and application to be no threat 
to employers who operate within the mandates 
of the law and clearly established public 
policy as set out in the duly adopted laws. 
Such employers will never be troubled by the 
public policy exception because their 
operations and practices will not violate 
public policy. 
Accordingly, where an employer has discharged 
an at-will employee because that employee 
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refused to violate the law or any well 
established and clear mandate of public 
policy as expressed in the constitution, 
statutes and regulations promulgated pursuant 
to statute, or because the employee reported 
to his superiors or to public authorities 
serious misconduct that constitutes 
violations of the law and of such well 
established and clearly mandated public 
policy, the employee has a cause of action in 
tort for damages for wrongful discharge. 
Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 877-78 (Mo. App. 
1985) [emphasis added]. 
The public policy exception rests upon the premise that the 
private power to discharge an at-will employee must be held 
subordinate to the public interest. A cause of action in tort is 
the best means of assuring responsible control of that private 
power. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the judgment for Heslop on his 
cause of action for breach of implied-in-fact contract. 
Additionally, the case should be remanded to the Trial Court with 
an instruction to award Heslop the amount of his attorney fees as 
an item of consequential damages. 
The case should also be remanded to the Trial Court for the 
sole determination of whether the Bank discharged Heslop in 
violation of public policy sounding in tort. If the Bank 
violated public policy, the trier of fact should be allowed to 
-19-
award Heslop any additional damages that are applicable in tort, 
including punitive damages. 
DATED this day of October, 1991. 
RONALD E. GRIFFIN 
Attorney for Ivan J. Heslop 
-20-
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ADDENDUM A 
1. Good Faith and Fair Dealing Implied in Every Contract 
The first, and perhaps threshold issue which must be resolved con-
cerns the circumstances under which the covenant will be implied A& 
noted, there is authority for the proposition that every contract ion-
tains a covenant of good faith and fair dealing.246 This contention is 
not without its critics, however.246 
The idea that every contract whether in the field of insurance or 
employment law is subject to standards of fairness and good taiih ib 
not as radical a proposition as some might suggest. The obligation ol 
good faith is well recognized as a component of the Uniform Cummer 
cial Code (the Code) and is part of the law of every jurisdiction which 
has adopted the Code. With respect to the sales of goods, secuntv de 
vices, commercial paper, banking, investment securities, and ever\ 
transaction covered by the Code the law requires "[e]very contract or 
duty within this act imposes an obligation of good faith in its pertorm-
ance or enforcement."247 Similarly, Tentative Draft No o to *h> Hi -
statement (Second) of Contracts would impose these obligation- on ni 
244 See Note, Protecting At-Will Employees Against Wrongful Distnii-u* Ik, 
Duty to Terminate only in Good Faith, 93 HARV L REV 1816-44 (1980; 
245 See .supra note 238. 
246 Gram v Liberty Mutual, 384 Mass. at 666, 429 N E.2d at 28 
^47 UCC § 1 203 (1978). E.g., IDAHO CODE § 28-1-203 (1980) 
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contracting parties.248 Further, the cases which are given credit for ini-
tiating bad faith actions in California likewise recognize the covenant 
as part of every contract.249 
Even in Idaho, the Supreme Court has allowed that these cove-
nants may be obligations of every contract. In Luzar u. Western 
Surety Cu 2*° the court recently considered the concepts of good faith 
and fair dealing in a case involving the conversion of pledged collateral. 
While the tacts of the case more closely approximate a secured transac-
tion dispute under the Uniform Commercial Code and are thus distin-
guishable from a wrongful discharge case, the court nonetheless de-
clared in dicta that: "Good faith and fair dealing are implied 
obligations of every contract."261 Whether the court truly meant "every 
contract" or had some more limited category in mind remains open to 
debate, but it certainly would not be without authority in extending 
the obligations to all contractual relationships. 
2, Principles of Bad Faith Torts Applicable to Employment 
Contracts 
While there may be reluctance to impose the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing in every contract, the principles which are the 
hallmark of bad faith in contract actions, generally, seem entirely ap-
plicable to an at-will employment contract. In California, the courts 
have identified three alternative standards which must be met in order 
for the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to be implied. These 
are: (1) where there exists a "special relationship" between the con-
tracting parties, (2) where there is a lack of balance in the contractual 
relationship, or (3) where there is a need to protect an injured victim 
from emotional harm likely to result from the peculiar facts of the 
c*ae.™* ThcSc conditions usually exist in most at-will employment con-
tracts but, undoubtedly, there are and will be situations where the con-
tractual relationship is more balanced or where other protections are 
recognized and render the "bad faith" exception unnecessary. 
The disparity of power and influence between the contracting par-
ties is the most compelling justification for an implied covenant. It has 
not always been ample justification, however, for the courts. In large 
248 Set out at supra note 238. 
249 See bupra note 222 and accompanying text. 
250 107 Idaho 693, 692 P.2d 337 (1984). 
251 Id. at 696, 692 P 2d at 340. 
252. See Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 129 Cal. App. 3d 4i6 
181 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1982), vacated, 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr 334 
(1984) 
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part the judiciary's reluctance lies in the tendency of advocates to 
equate an absence of good cause with the absence of good faith in the 
discharge of an employee.253 Obviously, there are certain analytic fala-
cies in that equation and something more seems to be required. 
The California appellate court decision of Cleary2** is an example 
of a case that contains those additional elements necessary to persuade 
a court to adopt a bad faith theory of action. Despite the court'* decla-
ration that "there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
in every contract,"255 the employee's long term service, coupled with 
the employer's established practice of dealing with its employee* in a 
fair manner, undoubtedly influenced the result.256 
The employer's practices, particularly those which provided for 
"due process" in termination proceedings was likewise found to be a 
significant element for the Montana Supreme Court when it adopted 
the good faith exception. Noting that an employee is entitled to *ome 
protection from injustice, the Montana court stated in Gutes r Life of 
Montana Insurance Co.: 
The circumstances of this case are that the employee entered 
into an employment contract terminable at the will of either 
party at any time. The employer later promulgated a handbook 
of personnel policies establishing certain procedures with re-
gard to terminations. The employer need not have done so. but 
presumably sought to secure an orderly, cooperative and loyal 
work force by establishing uniform policies. The employee hav-
ing faith that she would be treated fairly, then developed the 
peace of mind associated with job security. If the employer has 
failed to follow its own policies, the peace of mind of its via 
ployees is shattered and an injustice is done.257 
Also, in extending the good faith exception it is fir3t recognized m Tu/ -
tune, the Massachusetts courts have since indicated that in order for 
there to be a viable bad faith action, there must be demonstrated both 
injury to the employee and benefit to the employer.258 
253. Gram, 384 Mass. at 666, 429 N.E.2d at 28. 
254 111 Cai. App 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980) 
255. Id. at 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 728 (quoting Comurale v. Traders & I /CH M* K-» 
Co , 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P 2d 198, 202 (1958)). 
256. Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 724. 
257. 196 Mont. 178, 182, 638 P.2d 1063, 1067 (1982). See Keaneally v Ors^n 1 ^ 
Mont. 1, 606 P.2d 127 (1930). 
258. Stiles v. Traveral Laboratories, Inc., 13 Mass. App. 354, 433 N E 2d 10 i JD* 
peal denied, 386 Mass. 1103, 440 N.E.2d 1176 (1982). 
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3. The Exception Does Not Swallow Up The Rule 
One of the criticisms of bad faith actions in discharge cases is that 
the exception, if allowed, would swallow up the rule.260 This observa-
tion misconstrues the exception as well as the rule and requires some 
response. 
In Gram v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., the Massachusetts Su-
preme Court declined to adopt a rule equating the absence of good 
cause for a discharge with the absence of good faith.260 It continued to 
acknowledge the viability of the bad faith theory, however. This case is 
often cited as support for rejecting the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing altogether. If good faith means good cause, it is argued, then 
the doctrine of at-will employment is meaningless. If, by definition, an 
at-will employee is one who serves at sufferance and can be discharged 
for any cause or without cause, then how can the law logically require 
proof of good cause at the time of discharge? The argument obviously 
has appeal, but it does not necessarily nor completely undermine the 
good faith exception to the at-will doctrine. 
In the first place, the contradiction which is perceived in equating 
good faith with good cause is based upon a misunderstanding of the at-
will doctrine and its historic origins. The characterization of employ-
ment as at-will is in reality nothing more than an observation that no 
definite term of employment has been agreed to by the contracting 
parties. As was discussed earlier, the mere fact that there is no estab-
lished time period for the duration of the employment relationship 
does not signify the absence of a contractual relationship. Once a uni-
lateral contract has been entered into between the employer and the 
employee, that contract is renewed daily when the employee reports to 
work and extends his labor in acceptance of the employer's continuing 
offer of compensation. Viewed in this elementary sense, there is no 
principle of logic or law which precludes the imposition of conditions 
or covenants upon the employment contract Despite the existence of 
such conditions or covenants, which may limit other aspects of the re-
lationship, the employment remains at-will insofar as it has no agreed 
duration. 
The fundamental, analytic problem which arises in equating good 
faith with good cause is found in the presumption that since the em-
ployment has no agreed term, it may be terminated for any cause or 
without cause While this presumption is well recognized in the case 
259 Wheeler v. Data General Corp., No 82162, Idaho 4th Jud. Dist. (Oct 9, i%4) 
(unpublished opinion). 
260. 384 Mass. 659, 429 N.E.2d 21 (1981) 
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law,261 there is no reasoning which supports its continued application. 
It does not logically follow that because the employment has no speci-
fied term, cause is an unnecessary condition of termination. This pre-
sumption was manufactured from the pen of Horace Wood over one 
hundred years ago and found its only justification in the economic, so-
cial, and political climate existing at that time which favored employer 
privilege over employee protection. Wood's doctrine has been perpetu-
ated through blind adherence to the rule and stare decisis without any 
critical assessment of its integrity until recently. In the clear light of 
more contemporary analysis, there exists no justification for continued 
acceptance of a legal presumption which has lost whatever frail reason-
ing sustained it throughout the years past. 
Secondly, even if the common law is unwilling to discard the 
"cause" component of Wood's doctrine, it may nonetheless embrace a 
good faith exception to that doctrine without contradiction. In all like-
lihood the Massachusetts Supreme Court was correct in its refusal to 
equate good cause and good faith in Gram. As that court ah>o correctly 
ruled, this refusal does not require rejection of an exception to the at-
will doctrine which imposes a covenant of good faith and lair dealing 
on at-will contracts of employment. 
It does not require any special insight or brilliance to conclude 
that good faith and good cause are distinct concepts. To paraphrase 
the Idaho decision in Allen, good cause is a substantial reason—one 
which is not arbitrary, frivolous, or irrelevant, a reason which is 
founded upon conduct seriously prejudicial to the interests or welfare 
of the employer and its enterprise.262 Perhaps as was explored ear-
lier,263 special factual conditions and expressed or implied promises are 
necessary to impose a good cause requirement on an otherwise at-will 
employment contract. 
On the other hand, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is 
not a standard which measures the legal sufficiency of reasons given by 
an employer to justify termination, but rather involves an assessment 
of the lack of balance existing in the contractual relationship. It pro-
hibits the unreasonable, excessive, or abusive utilization of the em-
ployer's superior power and advantage in that relationship. Ab in the 
Gates decision, where the employer has established and promulgated 
certain procedures with regard to termination/64 the covenant h ^ de-
261. Thomas v. Ballou-Latimer Drug Co., 92 Idaho 337, 341, 442 P 2d ~i7. 771 
(1968). 
262. 105 Idaho 447, 455-56, 670 P.2d 854, 862-63 (1983). 
263. See supra Sections V. C. and D. 
264. 196 Mont, at 178, 638 P.2d at 1063. 
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fined the standards of fairness which govern the manner of employer 
conduct and has proscribed the commission of unwarranted excesses. 
Similary, where the employer has benefited by its conduct which has 
indicted injury upon an employee, as was the situation in the Ma.^a-
chu-etts cases which followed Fortune ™b then a bad faith claim may 
result 
There is nothing inherently inconsistent in an at-will ductr.ae 
whiLti allows an employer to discharge without cause and a covenant 
which requires that same employer to treat all employees fairly. The 
good faith exception does not necessarily conflict with the at-will doc-
trine except insofar as it challenges preconceived notions of absolute 
employer discretion assumed, without justification, to be part-and-par-
cel of that doctrine. To this extent the exception is no different than 
the other exceptions addressed throughout this article. Indeed, if there 
is any major dilference it is in the fact that the good faith exception 
strives to better equalize the legal equities between employers and em-
ployees, whereas the other exceptions only serve to alter the imbalance 
in specialized and more limited factual circumstances. 
Little more can be said about this exception at this point in \u 
development. As it evolves, in all likelihood there will be considerable 
reluctance to its universal application in every at-will employment con-
tract. Despite this reluctance, the idea that each contract is imbued 
with reciprocal responsibilities of good faith and fair dealing strikes 
very close to the heart of the social issues which have fueled erosions in 
the historic privileges of employers. More likely than not, courts will be 
hesitant to embrace the covenant and make its general application but 
where special circumstances exist, such as those noted in the oases 
identified, one can expect the courts' gradual accommodation. 
ADDENDUM B 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRXCT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH - NORTHERN DIVISION 
VERN L. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, Civil No. 87-NC-121G 
v. MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
BROWNING, a Utah Corporation, 
and DAVID W. RICH, 
Defendants. 
The above matter came on regularly for hearing on 
December 7, 1989 on Defendants' Motion for Certification for 
Interlocutory Appeal and Stay. David Bert Havas and Michelle E. 
Heward represented plaintiff, and Sharon Sonnenreich represented 
defendants. The court heard oral arguments and reviewed 
extensive briefs. Being fully advised, the court now enters its 
Memorandum Decision and Order. 
The Court denies defendants' Motion for Certification 
to the Tenth Circuit. 
The issue before the Court is driven by Utah law. It 
is clear to this court that the Utah Supreme Court recognizes a 
public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.1 
Berube v. Fashion Center, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989') ;2 Loose 
v. Nature-All Corporation, 1989 Utah Lexis 146 (Utah Nov. 27, 
1989). The majority in Loose said: nThe post Berube exceptions 
to the employment at will doctrine in Utah include termination in 
violation of public policy, . . ." Howcroft v. Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 712 F.Supp. 1514 (D. Utah April 28, 
1989), cited by the defendants is not inapposite. The public 
policy exception recognized in Berube was not at issue in 
Howcroft and Judge Anderson did not rule upon or even discuss it. 
This Court rules that an action for wrongful 
termination based upon the public policy exception to the at-will 
employment doctrine is an action founded upon tort rather than 
contract. The general rule in states recognizing such an 
exception characterize it as the tort of wrongful discharge.3 
This exception protects an at-will employee from being 
discharged for a reason or in a manner that contravenes sound 
principles of established and substantial policy. 
2
 Although there was no majority opinion in Berube, the 
Plurality opinion as well as Justice Zimmermann's concurrence 
indicated willingness to recognize a public policy exception. 
3
 Arthur S. Leonard in his law review article, A New Cordon 
Law of Employment Termination, North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 66, 
631 (1988) reviews reported cases and says: In Order to prevent an 
employer from acting contrary to an important public policy, some 
state courts have recognized a tort of "wrongful discharge" as an 
exception to the at will presumption. . . . Courts faced with a 
public policy argument have searched for an existing label to place 
on the resulting legal action. They have most frequently described 
2 
The clearest statement which appears to indicate the direction of 
Utah law on this matter is Justice Durham's plurality opinion in 
Berube: "Where an employee is discharged for a reason or in a 
manner that contravenes sound principles of established and 
substantial policy, the employee may typically bring a tort 
action against his employer" (emphasis added). Berube at 1042 
The rulings set forth in this memorandum decision and 
order will become the law of this case unless within 30 days 
after the date hereof a party or the parties jointly, on motion 
supported by memorandum and necessary documentation, request this 
court to certify the issues to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to 
Rule 41 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. If such a 
motion is filed, the court will set the matter for argument. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: January ^ >^ 1990, 
'JK^H / •^dufl-/-^. 
J./THOMAS GREENE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
COPIES TO: c n s l 1/24/90MP: 
David Havas, Esq. 
David R. Money, Esq. 
i t a s a t o r t o f w r o n g f u l d i s c h a r g e . . . . M (emphasis added) Id. at 
658-662. 
3 
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J5. Justifications for the Use of Punitive Damages in Wrongful 
Discharge Actions 
To determine whether the use of punitive damages is justified, 
one must return to the policies furthered by the creation of a cause 
of action for wrongful discharge. Objectives of wrongful discharge 
actions include protecting the public interest from interference 
with important public policies, facilitating some individual expec-
tations, and policing unsnvory conduct. Fundamentally, however, 
the obJ*ctlv$ of these actions la to correct the imbalance of power 
which results from the practical inability of unorganized employees 
to bargain individually for job security. Court** probably would not 
have undertaken the massive modifications of tort law and con-
tract principles that have made the creation of these rights of ac-
tion possible if they did not perceive unorganized employees as a 
vulnerable group in need of the law's protection. 
To a modest extent, then, courts are performing for at will em-
ployees the power-enhancing function that labor unions perform 
for organized employees. Yet, courts are unwilling to prescribe a 
"just cause" standard for discharge,110 probably because of concern 
•bout the inefficiencies such a standard would engender. As a prac-
tical matter, courts are unable to prescribe a just cause standard 
because they are ill-equipped for the avalanche of litigation that 
would result from such a standard. Th^y instead have created a 
cluster of theories that modify the balance of power presently ex-
isting in the relationship between employers and unorganized em-
ployees without unduly stressing judicial resources. 
Just as courts have awarded punitive damages to correct imbal-
ances of power in the context of insurance121 and product liability 
cases,iM these damages also can be a useful means of deterring the 
abuse of power in the employment context. Although there is no 
•mpirical proof that the threat of punitive damages deters undesir-
able behavior,ifi one can presume that the higher the risks of mis-
tonduct, the more likely that persons contemplating such conduct, 
*» . Gram v. Liberty Mut Ins. Co., 3S4 Mass. 659, 669 70, 429 N E 2d 21, 26 (1981) 
121. See supra notes 16257 and accompanying text. 
123L See $upra note 7. 
tJ3. See Owen, Civil Punishment, supra note 5, at 111 (calling for an empirical study of 
the deterrent effect of punitive damages). 
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especially corporate defendants,"4 will be deterred from engaging 
in it. 
If compensatory damages in a wrongful discharge case are rela-
tively small, an employer has little to lose by committing a wrong-
ful discharge. Likewise, in the absence of punitive damages, many 
employees would gain little by instituting an action for compensa-
tion. Because of the need for deterrence, it is in the public interest 
to encourage meritorious litigation instituted by private individu-
als. The need for the extra measure of deterrence and the incentive 
for private enforcement provided by punitive damages is even 
more compelling in jurisdictions that limit compensatory remedies 
to reinstatement and back pay, particularly when an employer's 
action contravenes some strong, independent public policy. Courts 
should not expect the employee, who is in a highly vulnerable posi-
tion, to protect the public interest by, for example, resisting an 
employer's request to commit a crime on pain of loss of employ-
ment. Instead, the courts should assume responsibility for discour-
aging violations of public policy. 
The absence of an administrative framework for resolving dis-
putes in wrongful discharge cases and the corresponding need to 
conserve judicial resources makes it desirable for courts to employ 
a remedy designed to prevent future incidents of wrongful dis-
charge. The prevention of wrongful discharge is especially impor-
tant because at will employees in lower paying positions who have 
little opportunity for advancement are less likely to resort to the 
legal system for a remedy than are at will employees in middle and 
upper management position*."* The imposition of a punitive rem-
edy also can be a strong and justifiable statement of moral disap-
proval of a defendant's abuse of his power. 
Finally, punitive damages serve a compensatory function in 
wrongful discharge cases. In jurisdictions that limit compensatory 
remedies to back pay and reinstatement, the assessment of puni-
tive damages serves to compensate deserving plaintiffs for intangi-
ble but nonetheless real injuries such as mental anguish and loss of 
status or professional reputation that attend discharge from en-
224. See id. at 107. 
225. See Note, Protecting Employee* at Will Against Wrongful Discharge The htkkt 
Policy txctption, ttti HANV L KKV IWll, 1042 46 (llNKI). 
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ployment Even in jurisdictions that permit a full panoply of tort 
remedies, some harmful effects of wrongful discharge, such as so-
cial stigma and loss of identification, status and marketability,1*6 
could remain unremedied. Moreover, even a plaintiff awarded a 
full measure of compensatory damages would not be made truly 
whole because she would not be compensated for transactional ex-
penses such as attorney's foes. 
The purposes underlying the doctrine of punitive damages are 
••rved by the use of punitive damages in appropriate wrongful dis-
charge cases. They enhance the admonitory force of wrongful dis-
charge actions, thus facilitating the objectives that militated for 
lh* creation of such actions. 
